Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and
Teaching (2005-2012)
Volume 5
Number 1 Journal of Business & Leadership

Article 4

1-1-2009

The Nominating Committee As An Antecedent of Effective
Corporate Governance
Brooke Stanley
Winthrop University

Steven A. Frankforter
Winthrop University

Bret Becton
University of Southern Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Stanley, Brooke; Frankforter, Steven A.; and Becton, Bret (2009) "The Nominating Committee As An
Antecedent of Effective Corporate Governance," Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice,
and Teaching (2005-2012): Vol. 5: No. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol5/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Peer-Reviewed Journals at FHSU Scholars Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching
(2005-2012) by an authorized editor of FHSU Scholars Repository.

Stanley et al.: The Nominating Committee As An Antecedent of Effective Corporate
Stanley, Frankforter, and Becton

Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice and Teaching
2009, Vol. 5, No. 1, 19-28

THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE AS AN ANTECEDENT OF EFFECTIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Brooke Stanley, Winthrop University
Steven A. Frankforter, Winthrop University
Bret Becton, University of Southern Mississippi
In this paper, we examine a possible antecedent to board effectiveness – the presence of a nominating committee. We
argue that director cooptation by CEOs, and therefore ineffectual governance, may result from allowing CEOs to appoint
sympathetic directors. Thus, because outside independent board members are more likely to be effective in their roles as
monitors of the CEO, and because such members are more likely to have been selected by nominating committees,
measures of board effectiveness should be positively associated with the presence of a nominating committee. Our results
are largely consistent with our hypotheses, and are thus instructive in the design of optimal governance mechanisms. We
find that firm profitability, frequency of compensation committee meetings, compensation committee size, and CEO
experience of compensation committee members are all higher among firms with nominating committees.
Despite the abundance of research on corporate boards
of directors in general, there is little research on board
committees in particular. Some of the most important
decisions made by corporate boards are made by these
committees, especially the nominating and compensation
committees, rather than the board at large. Board
committees are among the most important mechanisms to
facilitate director decision-making (Singh & Harianto,
1989). It is largely through the actions of the committees
that the board can attempt to provide incentives to maximize
managerial effort and minimize executive opportunism.
However, CEOs may circumvent board control through their
involvement in the director selection process.
Perhaps it is because the media and investors are
concerned about executive compensation plans that they see
as excessive, that there are a few papers that study the role of
the compensation committee. The extant literature includes
the work of Conyon and Peck (1998), who found executive
compensation is more closely aligned with performance at
firms with compensation committees dominated by outside
directors. Conyon and He (2004) found the level and type of
compensation granted to the CEO varies depending on the
composition of the compensation committee, in a way
consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Finally,
evidence from Vafeas (2003) showed that regulatory reforms
regarding compensation committee membership helped to
reduce CEO opportunism in setting pay.
There is, however, almost no literature on the board’s
other key committee, the nominating committee. Although
one of the board’s most important responsibilities is to
monitor the CEO, few board tasks are as crucial to the
successful achievement of this goal as deciding which
individuals merit director status. We believe that
nominating committees are central to effective corporate
governance because this committee can serve to screen for
qualified and independent board nominees. Absent a
nominating committee, new board members are typically
recommended by an existing board member, who may even

be the CEO that the board is responsible for monitoring.
Alternatively, directors at firms with nominating committees
may be more likely to be independent and may be more
likely to objectively monitor the CEO, and to mitigate
agency problems that result from the separation of
ownership and control. Vafeas (1999) found that
nominating committees are often comprised of directors who
are most likely to act independently and in the shareholders’
interests. Similarly, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) found
that firms with nominating committees appoint more
independent outside directors and have fewer directors with
conflicts of interest.
When a company lacks a nominating committee, it
permits the direct involvement of the CEO in board
decisions regarding director selection and recruitment, as
well as subsequent director assignments to committees and
the organization of activities by those committees. We
argue that a CEO’s involvement in director nominations may
ultimately be manifested in the functioning of the
compensation committee, since this would allow the CEO to
influence the terms of his/her compensation.
HYPOTHESES
We expect that when firms lack nominating committees,
it is a reflection of agency problems within the firm, which
may also manifest themselves in other ways (Fama and
Jensen, 1983). According to managerial power theory, there
are numerous reasons for boards and their committees to
cooperate with CEOs in ways that are not in the best interest
of the shareholders, most notably in the form of a suboptimal compensation contract (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004).
Directors may be inclined to agree to such contracts to win
reelection to the board, garner higher compensation for their
board service, or attempting to preserve the friendly nature
of their relationship with the CEO. One possible
explanation for this may be the lack of a nominating
committee. Without a nominating committee, it may
19
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become easier for CEOs to exert power over the board. This
may lead to increased influence with regard to the design of
his/her compensation arrangements so that his/her selfinterest is maximized, instead of firm value. Therefore,
agency problems that boards are expected to mitigate will
instead be exacerbated at firms without nominating
committees.

CEO Compensation
Agency theory predicts that when monitoring is weak,
as when a firm lacks an independent nominating committee
to select directors, CEO compensation will increase (Fama
& Jensen, 1983). Otherwise, the board as a whole,
invariably including the CEO, will evaluate candidates for
directorship. Excessive executive compensation has been
linked to managerial entrenchment and domination over
directors (Borokhovich, Brunarski, & Parrino, 1997) and
interlocking boards (Hallock, 1997). When a firm faces
significant external control because of the presence of a
large external block owner of shares, CEO compensation
diminishes (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). Additionally,
several studies have cast doubt on the relationship of
executive pay and firm performance (Deckop, 1988;
Murphy, 1985). In sum, high CEO compensation may
indicate weak board oversight and heightened CEO
influence over the compensation committee.

CEO Share Ownership
When executives have little equity at stake in their
company, they have a diminished interest in promoting
shareholder wealth, and can be expected to be more selfserving (Malatesta & Walkling, 1988). As CEO stock
ownership increases, there will be greater degrees of
alignment with the interests of the firm and its shareholders
(Eisenhardt, 1988; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When CEOs
hold substantial equity in their firms, risk and reward
perceptions are explicitly linked with those of shareholders,
making CEOs more likely to behave in shareholders’
interests (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003).
Greater CEO share ownership more closely aligns CEO
interests with those of shareholders, thus reducing the kind
of agency problems that require monitoring by the board of
directors. Therefore CEOs who are not prone to agency
problems are less likely to appoint sympathetic directors
over whom they can exert their power, making nominating
committees less necessary. In other words, CEO share
ownership and nominating committees can act as substitutes
to mitigate agency problems.

Hypothesis 3: Total CEO compensation will be
negatively associated with the presence of a
nominating committee.
Number of Compensation Committee Meetings
If unconstrained by the presence of a nominating
committee, a CEO may succeed in influencing board
nominations to favor individuals who are less likely to
constrain managerial autonomy (Fleischer, Hazard, &
Klipper, 1988). A key safeguard to board independence is to
hold more meetings. Meetings represent the fundamental
prerequisite for collaboration (McGrath, 1991), which can
have a significant impact on the performance of teams such
as boards of directors and their committees. Meetings
provide executives and directors with the opportunity to
share information, and more frequent meetings facilitate
better communication between these parties (Shivdasani &
Zenner, 2004). Increased board or committee meetings also
allow more time for directors/members to more actively
monitor management (Evans, Evans, & Loh, 2002). For
example, audit committees that meet more frequently are
more likely to be better informed and more diligent in
carrying out their duties (Abbott, Parker, Peters, &
Raghunandan, 2003; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006).
Finally, some researchers suggest that the number of
meetings in a year reveals the diligence of a board or
committee (Persons, 2006; Raghunandan & Rama, 2007)
and that increasing committee meeting time is key to
improving the effectiveness of boards and committees
(Conger, Finegold, & Lawler, 1998).
In addition, several studies document a relation between
meeting frequency and firm performance. Miller & Norburn
(1986) found that the frequency of board meetings is related
to the board’s ability to make decisions, and to company
performance. Zahara and Pearce (1989) concluded that the

Hypothesis 1: CEO share ownership will be
negatively associated with the presence of a
nominating committee.
Firm Profitability
Firm profitability is known to be related to governance
structure (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). The directors
of underperforming firms tend to exercise their power and
authority more readily, holding management to higher
standards of accountability (Alderfer, 1986; Mizruchi,
1983). We expect that profitable firms are those governed
by independent outside directors who effectively monitor the
CEO, and who successfully provide incentives to maximize
managerial effort and minimize executive opportunism.
Therefore, we predict that such directors are most likely
appointed by firms with nominating committees (Shivdasani
& Yermack, 1999).
Hypothesis 2: Firm profitability will be positively
associated with the presence of a nominating
committee.
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amount of interaction the board has with the CEO also
affects firm performance. Similarly, Vafeas (1999) found
that the frequency of board meetings is related to firm value,
suggesting it is an important feature of board function.
In summary, a higher frequency of committee meetings
reflects increased monitoring of the CEO by the board and
may result in better overall governance of the firm. We
consider meetings of the compensation committee in
particular, because we believe that if the CEO has power
over the board, this is most likely to manifest itself in the
functioning of this committee, since this would enable a selfinterested CEO to influence his own pay. And because
nominating committees are more likely to nominate
independent outside directors, and such directors are more
likely to monitor the CEO rather than rubber-stamp his/her
decisions, we believe that nominating committees are more
likely to be found in firms whose compensation committee
meets more frequently.

researchers have suggested that group size is important
because as size increases, so does the potential for
dissimilarity (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). As dissimilarity
increases, so does the diversity of perspectives and input,
making tit-for-tat strategies less likely. Zahara and Pearce
(1989) suggest that larger boards are more likely to be
heterogeneous in their industry experience and expertise,
which can improve the strategic direction of the firm.
Furthermore, as group size increases, group cohesion and
communication intensity become strained (Shaw, 1976).
Therefore, larger boards may not be as susceptible to
management domination as small boards (Davidson, Pilger,
& Szakmary, 1998). CEO domination of boards becomes
more difficult with larger boards because they are more
likely to resist managerial domination (Rosenstein, 1987).
In sum, this body of literature suggests that because of the
increased potential for homogeneity, group cohesion, and
intense communication, smaller compensation committees
are more likely to accept the status quo and yield to the
demands of the CEO.
To reiterate an earlier point, we believe that board
cooptation by the CEO is most likely to manifest itself in the
functioning of the compensation committee in particular,
and so we examine the size of this committee as it relates to
the presence of a nominating committee. Based on the
extant research regarding group size, we argue that larger
compensation committees are less prone to being controlled
by the CEO. That a compensation committee is independent
in its decision-making instead of cooperating with the CEO
suggests that its members were appointed to the board by a
nominating committee rather than by the CEO himself.

Hypothesis 4: The number of a firm’s
compensation committee meetings will be
positively associated with the presence of a
nominating committee.
Compensation Committee Size
Much empirical evidence suggests that small group size
may facilitate the manipulation of a board or committee by
the CEO for his own personal gain. Several studies suggest
that smaller groups tend to be more cooperative and thus
more susceptible to tit-for-tat strategies. There is ample
evidence in the social dilemma research that cooperation
declines as group size increases (Allison, McQueen, &
Schaerfl, 1992; Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992; Messick
& Brewer, 1983; Seijts & Latham, 2000). Evidence also
suggests that larger groups may be more effective at creating
an opportunity for dialogue (Tindale, Davis, Vollrath,
Nagao, & Hinsz, 1990) and more likely to consider minority
points of view (Tindale, Smith, Thomas, Filkins, & Sheffey,
1996). Furthermore, numerous researchers have
demonstrated that cohesion decreases as group size increases
(Bantel & Finkelstein, 1991; Halebian & Finkelstein, 1991;
Hoffman & Maier, 1961; Katz; 1949; Wiersema & Bantel;
1992). Additionally, organization theory literature suggests
that larger groups and organizations experience dynamic
tension due to the challenges related to coordination and
cooperation among more people. As a result, as
organizations or groups grow in size, they tend to become
more control-oriented (Mintzberg, 1979) using more formal
rules, regulations and processes than smaller organizations
or groups (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Smith, Smith, Olian,
Sims, O’Bannon, & Scully, 1994).
This size of boards and committees has also been the
subject of much research. There is evidence in the existing
literature to suggest that larger boards or committees are
more difficult for the CEO to control. For example,

Hypothesis 5: The size of a firm’s compensation
committee will be positively associated with the
presence a nominating committee.
CEO Experience of Compensation Committee Members
Experience, especially executive experience, plays an
important role in decision-making in organizations. The
effects of executive experience have been examined in
numerous contexts. Several studies have examined CEO
experience and its effect on firm strategies (Chaganti &
Sambharya; 1987; Govindarajan, 1989; Geletkancyz, &
Black, 2001; Hambrick, Geletkancyz, & Fredrickson, 1993;
Miller, 1991; Smith & White, 1987; Thomas, Litschert, &
Ramaswamy, 1991). Although this body of research
concerns how CEO experience affects CEO decisionmaking, it also has implications for how CEO experience
affects the decision making of CEOs when they serve on
compensation committees.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that important
organizational outcomes would reflect characteristics of
firms' "upper echelons" (top managers). If executive’s
backgrounds affect organizations as upper echelon theory
proposes, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the CEO
21
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experience of compensation committee members has some
type of effect on the functioning of the committee. We
believe that more experience as a CEO among compensation
committee members will result in increased vigilance as a
compensation committee member. Several studies provide
evidence that boards with more experience tend to be more
attentive. Factors such as education, job status, and
experience have been shown to be related to organizational
voice such that higher levels of the former are related to
higher levels of the latter.
Qualifications such as education and experience provide
members with more general knowledge resulting in a greater
ability to recognize problems or opportunities and to offer a
greater number of potential solutions (LePine & Van Dyne,
1998). This also results in greater confidence in one’s
ability to make suggestions at work making it more likely
that members will express concerns, make suggestions for
improvement, etc. (Farr & Ford, 1990). Furthermore, job
status provides access to information and freedom regarding
one’s behavior on the job. More status equates to more
information, more latitude to challenge the status quo, and a
greater sense of responsibility for outcomes (LePine & Van
Dyne, 1998).
Taken together this literature suggests that directors
with more CEO experience will be more effective in their
roles as monitors of a CEO. Due to the importance of the
compensation committee in particular, we consider the CEO
experience of its members. We propose that higher CEO
experience among compensation committee members is
associated with increased vigilance and effectiveness, which
should follow from these board members having been
selected by a nominating committee.

study. Before we analyzed data in a multivariate model, we
first performed a t-test to determine whether asset size
differed between the groups and found an insignificant tstatistic of .03. Thus, we were assured that the companies
remaining in our study were of similar size. We selected
2000 as the examination year because the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 led to widespread changes in
board structures and processes that would likely obscure our
investigation.
Measures and Analysis
The dependent variable was whether a firm employed a
nominating committee, coded 1 or 0. The independent
variables included compensation committee, CEO, and firm
performance factors. We identified three compensation
committee variables; the number of times it met, its size, and
the proportion of its members with CEO experience. Next,
we included two CEO variables; total CEO compensation
and the proportion of the firm‘s shares he/she owned.
Lastly, return on equity was selected as the firm
performance variable.
We introduced three control variables; duality, the
proportion of shares held by five percent owners, and firm
size (log of employees). Duality occurs when the CEO also
serves as chairman of the board. With such positioning
he/she may buffer or limit the amount of control a board
might impose on management (Donaldson & Davis, 1989,
1991; Williamson, 1985). Duality has been linked to board
independence (Chatterjee, Harrison, & Bergh, 2003) and to
firm profitability (Donaldson & Davis, 1991: Frankforter,
Davis, & Vollrath, 2001). Duality is a dichotomous variable
in which 0 represents outside board leadership, known as the
independent governance structure, and 1 represents instances
where the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board.
Diffused shareholders may have reduced incentives to
monitor management and thus, characterize managementcontrolled firms (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995).
Shareholders possessing significant equity holdings above
the five percent threshold that requires a section 13(d) filing
with the Securities and Exchange Commission often have
significant influence because the benefits of their
involvement in monitoring a company’s management
outweigh the costs (Demsetz, 1983). These large-block
owners have material influence over corporate policy
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), board composition (Pound, 1992),
and help to ensure the firm’s executives and officers act to
further the interests of shareholders (Bethel & Liebeskind,
1993). The greater combined holdings of five percent
owners, the greater their ability to monitor the firm, thus,
curbing agency issues (Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988).
We measured the total percentage of common stock held by
five percent owners.
Firm size may influence the form of power and
governance structures. For example, Finkelstein and
D’Aveni (1994) reported that organization size tended to

Hypothesis 6: The CEO experience of
compensation committee members will be
positively associated with the presence of a
nominating committee.
METHOD
Design
We randomly selected 100 publicly-listed firms that
possessed nominating committees. Next, we selected
control group firms in the same industry that lacked
nominating committees. We employed case-control
procedures described by Seabright, Levinthal, and Fichman
(1992). Case-control designs are suited to studying events
that are relatively rare in occurrence. Firm size was selected
as a matching variable because it could potentially confound
results. We obtained a matching of control group firms
within 2-digit SICs, stratifying controls on the basis of total
assets and selecting firms lacking nominating committees
that were nearest in total assets within the same 2-digit SICs
to each in the experimental group (Singh & Harianto, 1989).
This resulted in a total of 200 firms to be examined in our
22
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affect the use of dual structures, the power of its executives,
and firm performance. We controlled for firm size by
computing the log of the total number of employees
(Frankforter et al., 2001).
We obtained total CEO compensation data from
ExecuComp. Total CEO compensation included the sum of
salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of
restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted,
long-term incentive payouts, and all other total
compensation. We computed and used the log of total CEO
compensation to control for nonlinear data. Firm size and
return on equity were obtained from Research Insight. All
other data were indentified from an examination of proxy
statements. We employed hierarchical logistic regression
analysis to test our model and used one-tailed tests because
our hypotheses predict direction. The model is described
below:

3.

firm size (log of employees)

as well as:
B) the following experimental variables:
1. the number of compensation committee meetings
2. the side of the compensation committee
3. the proportion of compensation committee
members with experience as a CEO at another
company
4. total CEO compensation
5. the proportion of the firm‘s shares the CEO owned
6. the firm’s return on equity
RESULTS
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics, variation inflation
factors, and the correlation matrix. We addressed
muticollinearity concerns by examining correlations and
variation inflation factors. No correlation coefficient
exceeded .36. Additionally, none of the variation inflation
factors surpassed 1.30, far from the critical limit of 10
(Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989). These results
supported our conclusion that muticollinearity did not
threaten to contaminate our results.

The adoption of a nominating committee by a corporation
(no = 0; yes = 1) is a function of:
A) the following control variables:
1. presence of a dual governance structure
2. The proportion of shares held by five-percent
owners

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Variation Inflation Factors (VIFs), and the Correlation Matrix

1.

Nominating
committee
2. Duality
3. Five percent
ownership
4. Firm size
5. Committee
meetings
6. Committee size
7. CEO experience
8. CEO ownership
9. CEO
compensation
10. Return on equity

5.

Committee
meetings
6. Committee size
7. CEO experience
8. CEO ownership
9. CEO
compensation
10. Return on equity

Mean

S.D.

VIF

1

2

3

.50

.50

---

---

.65

.48

1.104

.002

---

24.13

16.08

1.164

-.028

.065

---

.64

.67

1.141

.211**

.057

.039

---

3.52

2.55

1.145

.255***

-.145*

-.110

.101

3.10
.54
.04

.94
.50
.07

1.161
1.064
1.284

.298***
.126
-.176*

.123
-.023
.161*

3.46

.62

1.144

.123

.124

-.105

.118

11.38

15.81

1.091

.140*

.082

.017

.121

.027
.050
.351***

4

.258***
.163*
-.022

--.145*
.053
-.246***

--.003
-.123

---.092

---

.179**

-.053

-.011

-.106

.072

-.118

.005

.185**

-----

* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Results

Variables
Constant
(Standard Error)
Duality
Five percent ownership
Firm size

Model 1
Beta
-.431
(.343)
-.040
(.306)
-.005
(.009)
.663*
(.225)

Model 2
Beta
-4.166
(1.265)
.006
(.348)
.003
(.010)
.297
(.252)
.181**
(.075)
.637***
(.204)
.543*
(.328)
-4.664
(3.692)
.230
(.270)
.019*
(.011)

266.899
.046
.061
9.380
60.0
200
3

234.031
.190
.254
42.247
67.5
200
9

Committee meetings
Committee size
CEO experience
CEO ownership
CEO compensation
Return on equity

-2 log-likelihood
Cox and Snell R2
Nagelkerke R2
chi-square
Percent correctly classified
n
df
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

Table 2 displays the logistic regression results. Model 1
reports the results for the control variables with a
Nagelkerke R2 of .061. Model 2 adds the six experimental
variables to the equation. The Nagelkerke R2 for this model
is .254, with a substantial increment in the multiple squared
correlation coefficient (ΔR2 = .193). Model 2 reveals
significant main effects for the number of compensation
committee meetings, compensation committee size, CEO
experience of compensation committee members, and return
on equity. Greater numbers of compensation committee
meetings, larger compensation committee size, greater CEO
experience of compensation committee members, and
increased firm return on equity were associated with the
presence of nominating committees. However, the main
effects for CEO ownership and CEO compensation were not
significant. In summary, hypotheses 2, 4, 5 and 6 were
supported.
With the proliferation of committees in corporate
governance structures, our results suggest that increased

attention may be warranted regarding the presence of certain
committees and how committees are organized. This study
reveals evidence supporting a contention that firms
possessing nominating committees are typified by a more
active board and improved financial performance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although agency theory has been one of the most
dominant management theories over the past few decades,
empirical tests of its predictions often produce mixed and
confusing results. For example, Eisenhardt’s (1989)
concluded that agency theory was an empirically valid
perspective. Other research suggests, however, that agency
theory has little explanatory or predictive power. Dalton et
al. (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of empirical
ownership-performance studies and found few examples of
systemic relationships and little support for agency theory.
In contrast to the objections of these studies, we find
24
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significant results suggesting that agency problems do arise.
Improving our understanding how they might be mitigated
or exacerbated may lead to improved governance standards
and practices.
We begin with the observation that there is a dearth of
extant literature regarding the existence and structure of
board committees. This study contributes to our
understanding of corporate governance by examining a
possible antecedent to board effectiveness – the presence of
a nominating committee. We argue that because outside
independent board members are more likely to be effective
in their roles as monitors of the CEO, and because such
members are more likely to have been appointed by
nominating committees, measures of board effectiveness
should be positively associated with the presence of a
nominating committee. Our results are largely consistent
with our hypotheses, and are thus instructive in designing
guidelines for firms to improve the efficacy of their boards.
Director cooptation by the CEO, and therefore an
ineffective board, may be most readily be achieved by
allowing CEO involvement in board nominations. The
results of this study suggest that four measures of board
effectiveness are associated with the presence of a
nominating committee. First, we find that firm profitability
is positively associated with the presence of a nominating
committee. This suggests that the nominating committee
serves as a vital tool to ensure effective monitoring of the
CEO by the board of directors to reduce the possibility of
agency problems. Nominating committees reduce the
amount of influence a CEO has over board composition and
activities, thus increasing the amount of autonomy the board
has in monitoring CEO activities and performance, which
may reduce opportunistic behavior by a CEO.
Second, the results indicate that compensation
committees at firms with nominating committees tend to
meet more frequently. As discussed earlier, the number of
meetings has been shown to be associated with numerous
conditions necessary for effective corporate governance such
as collaboration, communication, goal commitment,
monitoring, informedness, and vigilance. Thus it appears
that greater frequency of compensation committees meetings
reflects improved governance that follows from directors
being selected by a nominating committee rather than
appointed by the CEO or another self-interested insider.
Third, the results indicate that firms with larger
compensation committees tend to have nominating
committees. We believe that one possible explanation for
this is that it may be easier for CEOs to manipulate and
control smaller committees. Smaller compensation
committees may be symptomatic of director cooptation and
ineffectiveness.
Finally, we find that CEO experience of compensation
committee members is higher at firms with nominating
committees. The extant literature suggests that greater
executive experience results in increased vigilance and
effectiveness as a director. Thus greater CEO experience

among compensation committee members is indicative of an
independent committee that seeks to design an optimal
compensation contract rather than cooperate with the CEO.
This suggests that compensation committee members are
more effective when they are selected by nominating
committees instead of appointed by CEOs.
We conclude from these results that the presence of a
nominating committee is a critical factor in the design of
effective corporate governance mechanisms, and believe the
findings of our study are important and informative to both
researchers and practitioners. Although there is no shortage
of guidance on how to improve board governance and
mitigate executive opportunism, we feel that this study
makes a significant and needed contribution by highlighting
the importance of nominating committees in accomplishing
these tasks. Most notably, practitioners would do well to
ensure that their firms form nominating committees in order
to ensure that appropriate directors are chosen, thereby
increasing the efficacy of the board at large in its
responsibility of monitoring management. It should be
noted that the 2003 decision by the Securities and Exchange
Commission to require all NYSE-listed companies to adopt
nominating committees is consistent with the findings of this
study. However, in light of our findings, its decision to
exclude NASDAQ-listed firms from the same requirement
should be revisited.
One limitation of this study is its examination of preSarbanes-Oxley corporate governance conditions. Thus, we
excluded evaluation of many of the independence-promoting
facets that led to greater director autonomy vis-à-vis CEOs.
However, we believe this approach to be appropriate so that
it can distinguish between pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley
corporate governance conditions and effects.
Future research on nominating committees should
center on the details of how nominating committees
function. Specifically, a greater understanding is needed of
how they identify individuals who merit director status and
how they resolve internal conflicts when multiple candidates
are identified. In addition, future research should consider
the evolution of the bargaining game between the CEO and
shareholders, and whether or not the nominating committee
can help to ensure that the balance of power remains in the
hands of the board. Finally, the literature should examine
the interactions of the board’s various committees, and
whether there are a select few directors who serve on the
board’s most important committees, such as the
compensation and nominating committees.
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